n just a few short years, Australian law has seen a burgeoning of pre-emptive controls on the liberty of certain individuals so as to prevent criminal activity. Starting with sex offenders around the turn of the century, more recently the net has widened so as to catch would-be terrorists and now also members of motorcycle clubs or 'bikie gangs'. Despite attempts to portray these Commonwealth, state and territory legislative developments as a contemporary extension of historical antecedents,1 it is undeniable that socalled 'control orders' imposing specific restrictions on individuals, absent any prior criminal conviction, are an unprecedented phenomenon in Australia.2 The purpose of this article is twofold. First, I consider the role which incremental developments in the constitutional jurisprudence of the High Court have played in facilitating the emergence of such orders and argue that the Court has steadily cleared the way for greater experimentation by Australian legislatures in devising pre-crime schemes of this sort. Second, I examine the recent enactments of South Australia3 and New South Wales4 enabling the proscription of certain groups, which although publicly justified as measures to curb bikie-related violence could easily be employed against any organisation. Both schemes are clumsy amalgams of the preventative mechanisms of proscription and control orders featured in recent Commonwealth anti-terrorism legislation. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the recent South Australian Supreme Court decision5 which found the law in that jurisdiction to be unconstitutional. Far from being a major victory for civil liberties, I shall argue that the result, while not insignificant, is merely a setback for the advance of the preventative justice project in the longer term.
The effect of this appeared to be twofold: first, involuntary detention is, subject to some exceptions, the domain of the judicial arm of government; and second, its use is restricted to punishment of persons found guilty of a criminal offence. The idea that the legislature could authorise a federal court to deprive citizens of their freedom on some other basis involving the application of non-judicial power was firmly rejected by their Honours as inconsistent with the insulation of Chapter III courts from the political arms of government by the Constitution.l 0 In Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)11 the Court struck down the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) on the basis that it conferred upon the Supreme Court of that state a function which was incompatible with its occasional exercise of federal judicial power under section 77(iii) of the Constitution. Curiously, the Act applied in respect of only a specified individual against whom s 5(1) empowered the Supreme Court to make a detention order if satisfied on reasonable grounds that: (a) the person is more likely than not to commit a serious act of violence; and (b) it is appropriate, for the protection of a particular person or persons or the community generally, that the person be held in custody. The majority of the High Court found that this scheme compromised the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court by making it appear an instrument of the executive's policy to maintain the imprisonment of the individual in question without recourse to ordinary legal processes.12 This was offensive to the integrity of judicial power under the Constitution,13 While the use of the Constitution s separation of judicial power to invalidate a state Act was a surprising offshoot of the Boilermakers principle, Kable did not simply extend that principle to the states. The majority recognised that a State Court could still hold non-judicial powers -it just required these not be incompatible with judicial power. In Baker v R, Kirby J lamented the fact that the course of later decisions had rendered Kable 'a constitutional guard-dog that would bark but once'.14 In his Honour's view, 'a principle of general operation was stated',15 granting the Supreme Court the power to make interim or continuing detention orders against a prisoner currently serving time for a serious sexual offence. A 6:1 majority of the Court found the law to be valid, assisted by the several procedural features which distinguished the Act from that which was challenged in Kable -not least of which being that it was of general application. Crucially, 'the common and defining constitutional characteristic -that they imposed punishment for possible rather than proven criminal conduct'17 -was not seen by the Fardon majority as dictating the result through an application of Kable. Although the latter was preserved as a source of principle,18 it was effectively focused on issues of process rather than substance. The crime o f terrorising the Australian community has no equivalent among any other illegal activity and it trivia Uses the law's contribution to counter-terrorism to suggest that the same measures can be applied in other, lesser contexts. 
